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CHANGES IN THE POWER STRUCTURE WITHIN THE
FAMILY IN THE LATE ROMAN REPUBLIC
CHRISTOPH G.

PAULUS*

I
The horrible and terrifying history of the last century B.C., with all
its political, social, and religious revolutionary disturbances, is notorious. Thus, there is no need to go into it. It is sufficient to mention

that, at the end of this epoch, the political order and social structure
were different than at its beginning.' These changes in the large scale
provoke the less familiar question as to whether, and if so how, they
influenced the "little scale"-the family.
From a legal perspective there are indications of a similar revolutionary disturbance in the power structure within upper class Roman
families. The baker's family in Ostia or the wine seller's family in
Pompeii existed without major changes to their structural integrity.
But, since the aforementioned indications derive from the law of succession, my guess is that changes primarily took place within the elite
families. I am in agreement with David Daube 2 that this area of law
was mainly a domain of the upper ten percent. This does not preclude
the existence of some personal interest in the law of succession among
the lower ninety percent. But, in all probability, they were not the
main addressees of the respective regulations.
II
There were three legal events that were important to the evolution of family relations: the introduction of the querela inofficiosi testamenti, the enactment of the lex Falcidia, and the insertion of the
clause 'si quis ommissa causa' into the praetor's edict. The praetor's
edict contained another very important set of regulations-the praetorian rules for the succession contra tabulas. These regulations made it
possible to void a testator's will to those children who were not mentioned in the will, and marked the highly important transition from
* Christoph G. Paulus, Dr. iur. (Munich), LL.M. (Berkeley, Cal.) is Professor of Law at
the Humboldt University at Berlin.
1. See only Syme, The Roman Revolution, 1939 (paperback reprint 1960).
2. Daube, The Preponderance of Intestacy at Rome, in: Collected Studies in Roman Law
II, 1991, p. 1087 seq. Additionally, Champlin, Final Judgements, 1991, p. 41 seq.
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agnatic to cognatic descent. But, the date and the circumstances of
the origin of this edict clause are too vague and uncertain to justify its
treatment in this context.
To facilitate an understanding of the historical development, it is
helpful to imagine a common family scenario: a dispute between the
paterfamiliasand his son which took place before the introduction or
"invention" of the three aforementioned legal novelties. The reason
for this dispute might be that the father wanted his son to do certain
things-let us say, to step into a senatorial career. 3 Perhaps the son
did not want a senatorial career but instead preferred a life as an actor
or some such. A heated debate developed between them and
culminated when the father yelled, "If you do not obey and do not
become a senator you can forget the inheritance. I will disinherit
you!" What a powerful bargaining chip for the father!
From a legal perspective, the father had every right to disinherit
his son. Legal historians concentrated for a long time on this legal
side of a father's power. They had reason to do so since the jurist
Gaius (among others) emphasized that nobody else had such a strong
power over the children as "we Romans do have."'4 But, the actual
social life had more facets than just the legal one. 5 As a matter of
course, there existed conventional and other pressures that made it a
bit more difficult for the father to express such a threat, let alone to
realize it. In the present context, the most important one was the custom or practice of seeing one's children as natural heirs and setting up
one's will accordingly. Such a custom can be found in almost every
legal system that offers the freedom to set up a will. For example,
Plato said in this context, "I tell you that these goods are not yours;
they rather belong to your lineage, the past as well as the future one."'6
The same notion is found most dominantly in the intestate law of succession, where the children are treated as necessary heirs. It is noteworthy that this necessity was also applicable to the testate law, the
3. For "dynastic" tendencies within senatorial families see Hopkins/Burton, Political Succession in the Late Republic, in: Hopkins, Death and Renewal, 1983, p. 31 seq. (reviewed in 103
Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung fIr Rechtsgeschichte, romanistische Abteilung 514 (1986) by the
present author).

4. Institutes 1.55. See, e.g., Eyben, Fathers and Sons, in: Rawson (ed.), Marriage, Divorce
and Children in Ancient Rome, 1991, p. 114 seq.; Corbier, Family Behavior of the Roman Aris-

tocracy, in: Pomeroy (ed.), Women's History and Ancient History, 1991, p. 173 seq.
5. Sailer, Corporal Punishment, Authority, and Obedience in the Roman Household, in:
Rawson (ed.), Marriage, Divorce, and Children in Ancient Rome (N. 5), p. 144 seq.; Dumont,
L'imperium du paterfamilias, in: Parentd et strat6gies familiales dans L' antiquitd Romaine,
1990, p. 475 seq.

6. Nomoi XI. 923 a.
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only difference being that here the necessity was forced by mores and
social expectations instead of by law.
The philosopher Seneca said some one hundred years later that,
7
in general, such a social compulsion is more effective than the law.
Nevertheless, from the middle of the first century B.C., there must
have been more and more intolerable and unacceptable exceptions.
We are told by Valerius Maximus 8 that, at about this time, suits in
which some close relatives tried to get their share of the family goods
were successful for the first time. For example, a son contested the
validity of his natural father's will even though he was adopted by his
uncle. Valerius stressed that the action was successful, despite the fact
that Pompeius, a powerful statesman and colleague of Caesar's, was
testamentary witness as well as heir. Another example is a suit exactly
the reverse. A father received the praetorianheirship (bonorumpossessio) of his son's estate even though he had given his son up for
adoption.
These are the beginnings of what finally became known as the
querela inofficiosi testamenti, which is the historical root of the modem legitimate portion. It is important to point out that, at its initial
sanction, a successful querela made the whole testament void, not just
parts of it. The justification for this rather harsh consequence was the
belief that a testator who totally or in part neglected his close relatives
in his will must have been mentally deranged. The Romans called this
phenomenon color insaniae,which was probably influenced by Greek
rhetoric.
It was an extraordinary threat to a testating Roman that his will
could be totally annulled and his estate distributed according to the
laws of intestate succession. It is almost impossible to overestimate
the importance and meaning of the will in ancient Rome. For the moment it suffices to remember the famous, if not somewhat exaggerated, statement of the elder Cato that the one day on which he lived
without a testament was one of the three things in his life that he
regretted. 9 Cicero even ranked the setting up of a will among the
means to gain immortality. I will return to this below.
These few hints give a first impression of the social background
against which a total nullity sanction is to be seen. Its threatening
7. De beneficiis V. 21.1. The same notion exists still today. See, e.g., Reisman, Lining Up:
The Microlegal System of Queues, 54 U. Cin. L. Rev. 417 (1985); Weyrauch/Bell, Autonomous

Lawmaking: The Case of the "Gypsies", 103 Yale L.J. 323 (1993).
8. Facta et dicta memorabilia 7.7.2 and elsewhere.
9. Plutarch, Cato 329.
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imminence must have influenced the power structure within the family, at least from a legal perspective. If the dispute between the paterfamilias and his son now came to the point where the father
threatened his son with disinheritance, the son could relax and lean
back. The possibility of disinheritance was drastically reduced, with
the law requiring good cause for it. If the father did not have good
cause, he risked losing his will. Thus, the novelty of the querela was
that a good cause could be contested through a judge and not just
through public opinion. The common testamentary succession, which
was followed before because of mores and social expectations, was
now sanctioned and enforced by law.
The querela inofficiosi was step number one in the historical
evolution of family relations. Step number two followed in the year
A.D. 40 when the lex Falcidiawas enacted. The lex Falcidiawas necessary because the testators were still threatened by the ineffectiveness
of their wills, notwithstanding the existence of the querela. The heirs
would not enter upon their heirship, or respectively, they would not
accept it. A will without accepting heirs was ineffective and therefore
the succession was ruled by intestacy.
The heirs' reaction was again the testators' fault. The testators
learned their lesson from the introduction of the querela and installed
their kin as heirs. They added so many legacies, however, that substantially none of the assets was left for the heirs. Thus, from a materialistic point of view, it was quite undesirable for an heir to enter
upon the offered heirship.
The enactment of the lex Falcidia was an attempt to handle this
danger for wills in general. It guaranteed the heir one-quarter of the
testator's assets even though the testator might have given away more
than three-quarters to other people. The details of this regulation
were complicated and gave rise to disputes for centuries. But, for this
Article, the significance of the lex Falcidiais that heirs were protected
by the reservation of one-quarter of the testator's estate for them.
According to Gaius, 10 the lex Falcidia was the final lex in a series
of legislative enactments that started approximately 160 years earlier.
The purpose of this series of enactments was to protect the heir from
getting nothing out of the estate. Gaius stated that the first enactment
was the lex Furia which forbade any legacy exceeding 1000 Asses, a
very modest sum even in those days. Some thirty years later, in 169
B.C., the lex Voconia was enacted and prohibited any legatee from get10. Institutes 2.224 seq.

1995]

CHANGES IN THE POWER STRUCTURE WITHIN THE FAMILY

1507

ting more of the assets than the heir. The lex Voconia was necessary
because the lex Furia had been circumvented by ordering not just one
legacy of 1000 Asses to the legatee, but several of them. One hundred
and thirty years later, the aforementioned lex Falcidia was enacted.
It is still debated whether or not Gaius was correct in his assumption that the lex Furia, lex Voconia, and lex Falcidia were all part of
the same series. To be sure, they certainly belonged together insofar
as their common goal was to preserve at least a part of the estate for
the heir. But, Gaius's idea of a causality between the laws seems to be
somehow inconsistent. The period of some thirty years between the
enactment of the lex Furia and the enactment of the lex Voconia is
quite a long time during which the heirs did not get an acceptable
portion of the estate. The one hundred years until the enactment of
the lex Falcidia is even more inexplicable. Why did the legislature
wait such a long time to satisfy the needs of the heirs, especially in
light of the fact that inheritance was at that time the main source of
income, at least for the senatorial class?
This is not to deny a practical necessity for the enactment of the
lex Falcidia. On the contrary, it is very likely that there were a large
number of heirs who received nothing or only a small portion of the
estate prior to the Falcidian law guaranteeing them one-quarter. But,
most likely, the legislative purpose for the lex Falcidia was not the
circumvention of the lex Voconia. Rather, the lex Falcidia was probably a response to a dramatic change in the conditions and circumstances of the Roman society. As far as I can tell, there are at least
two factors supporting this assumption.
The first factor is the difference between the Falcidia'sapproach
toward its legislative goal as compared to the approach of its predecessors. The leges Furiaand Voconia tried to protect heirs in indirect
ways, first by prescribing an absolute maximum amount of legacies
and then by prescribing a relative amount. In contrast, the lex Falcidia
solved the problem in a very direct manner by reserving one-quarter
of the estate for the heir, regardless of the number and size of the
legacies. This directness parallels that of the querela inofficiosi testamenti. Indirect pressure from testate attitudes or the praetorianrule
of succession would no longer suffice. The heirs needed more effective assistance. The law offered that assistance.
It is necessary to discuss a possible argument against the legitimacy of the comparison of the lex Falcidia to the querela. The
Falcidian quart was not restricted to those heirs who were protected
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by the querela, that is to say the next of kin. Instead, the quart was
granted to the heir as such, whether or not he was a relative of the
testator. This is indeed an important distinction since this Article examines family relations while the Falcidian law extends far beyond
that circle.
The testators' attitudes changed. Before the introduction of the
querela, testators skipped their close relatives, especially their children, simply by disinheriting them. Under the regime of the querela
and before the enactment of the lex Falcidia,testators obeyed the law
and established their relatives as heirs. They undermined the heirs'
legal position, however, by creating vast numbers of legacies whose
fulfillment left little or nothing to the heirs."
The testators' closest relatives were the primary targets of the
Falcidian law's protection. The reason for extending the law's protection to all heirs, including the extraneous, could be that the extraneous
no longer felt obliged to play the unpleasant role of distributor of the
estate. This role was, most likely, not unknown in earlier times as the
enactments of the leges Furia and Voconia amply demonstrate. But,
why should the extraneous continue playing this role when even the
next of the testator's kin no longer hesitated to use the querela to
nullify the will?
There are, at least, two factors which support my supposition that
children were the primary addressees of the lex Falcidia. First, the
testamentary custom of installing one's children as heirs continued
well into the times of the Principate. This is true even though Ulpian
reported that the querela was a common remedy in his days. 12 In Ulpian's time, the querela had long since become a means to bring the
heir's share up to the Falcidian quarter.
Secondly, a passage in Cicero's de officiis serves as the second
factor supporting my earlier assumption that the enactment of the lex
Falcidiawas a reaction to the changed parameters of the actual social
life rather than to attempts to circumvent the lex Voconia. In the first
book of his doctrines of duties, Cicero dealt with charities and openhandedness (beneficentia and liberalitas) as well as with their limits

11. This, at least, is a very typical constellation of facts in the Digest title 35.2 which deals
explicitly with the lex Falcidia.
12. Digests 5.2.1.
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and the precautions which have to be given to responsible and ethical
13
behavior. It is in this context that he wrote:
[O]ur beneficence should not exceed our means; for those who wish
to be more open-handed than their circumstances permit are guilty
...they do wrong to their next of kin; for they transfer to strangers

property which would more justly be placed at their service or bequeathed to them.
We know from his letter to Atticus 14 that Cicero finished de officiis on November fifth, in the year 44 B.c., four years before the enactment of the lex Falcidia. De officiis and the lex Falcidia are
strikingly similar, the main difference being that Cicero appealed to
the Pflichtgef-ihl (sense of duty) when he declared it more just to
leave one's fortune, besides all the necessary liberalities, to the next of
kin. But, this appeal was too weak. Only four years later the law had
to enforce what the sense of duty could no longer guarantee.
This similarity between Cicero's book and the lex Falcidia is
hardly accidental. It seems, rather, there was an increase in testamentary distributions that the testating and inheriting Roman upper class
could no longer accept. This conjecture would be admissible even if
Cicero would give here only a translation of Panaitios. 15 Cicero, however, generally did not blindly follow Panaitios's model but rather
transformed the Greek original in a sovereign and carefully calculated
manner to the needs and expectations of the Roman audience.
Moreover, legal protection for the next of kin, especially the children, was not a historical novelty of the lex Falcidia. For example,
Plato restricted the testamentary freedom of those who died without
having natural children to one-tenth of their mobile goods with the
remainder, including the real estate, going to adopted children.1 6 According to the law of Gortyn, foreign heirs were not allowed to get
more than one-half of a son's share. 17 Epikteta's will included the
consent of her daughter right in the beginning.' 8 And, under the Syrian-Roman law book, the children were to get one-quarter even if
they were disinherited.' 9
13. 14.44:. .. ne benignitas maior esset quam facultates, quod qui benigniores volunt esse
quam res patitur, primo in eo peccant, quod iniuriosi sunt in proximos; quas enim copias his et
suppeditari aequius est et relinqui, eas transferunt ad alienos.
14. XVI.1.4.
15. Cicero ad Atticum XVI.11.4.
16. Nomoi XI. 924 a.
17. X. 48 seq.

18. For this testament, see Wittenburg, I1Testamento di Epikteta, Trieste 1990.
19. L. 1 and 9.
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Taken together, the peculiarities of the lex Falcidia establish this
statute as a further move in restructuring family relations. Since the
law guaranteed them one-quarter of the testator's estate, the children
were more willing to accept or enter upon their heirship. At that time,
the law provided the children sufficient protection in guaranteeing
them their share of the testator's estate. It is noteworthy that the subsequent development of the Roman law of trusts (fideicommissa)
opened a loophole to the detriment of the heirs. The loophole closed
some one hundred years later through the Senatus consultum Pegasianum. But, this development was presumably conditioned upon the
legal enforceability of trusts, which Augustus enacted quite a long
time after the end of the Republic.2 0
Step number three in the historical evolution of family relations is
a reaction in the opposite direction. After sufficient grounds were established for the heir to enter upon the deferred inheritance, a new
risk for the testament emerged. There were still heirs who could gain
from the nullification of the will. This happened when intestate succession offered the heirs more than one-quarter of the testator's estate. These heirs could reject the inheritance or make use of their ius
abstinendi by refraining from entering upon the inheritance if they
were the testator's children and under the testator's power at the time
of his death. This meant that the testator was succeeded ab intestato
and that his will was virtually worthless. This was a very unpleasant
vision for the Romans. 21

The Roman appreciation of wills was not based on the fact that
they were documents distributing a deceased's goods. That was more
or less a legal technicality that served a more deeply-rooted, almost
anthropological purpose. A will guaranteed that the testator would be
remembered after his death. In his Tusculanes, Cicero called this a
form of immortality. 22 To be sure, immortality in this context has
nothing in common with the modern connotations of the word. There
are not the slightest resemblances, especially to the Christian notion
of eschatology. Instead, the Romans simply wanted to be kept in the
memory of the living. This is a fundamental and ubiquitous understanding of immortality. We probably would not know of the pharaoh
Cheops if he had not built his pyramid, and Horace, in writing his
20. This is my preliminary answer to David Johnston, who has comprehensively dealt with
"The Roman Law of Trusts," 1988.
21. For the following, see my book, Die Idee der postmortalen Pers0nlichkeit im rdmischen
Testamentserbrecht, 1991.
22. . 31.
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poetry, has constructed a monument more lasting than bronze
(carm.III.30). This notion still exists today. In I. Allende's novel Eva
Luna, Eva's mother tells her nine-year-old daughter that she will not
die until she is forgotten. Dedication tablets at American universities
are another example of a striving to be remembered.
From a sociological point of view, the Roman testament took
over the testator's position in society. It was akin to a map of the
social network in the middle of which the testator was replaced by the
testament. The testament held this network together and functioned
as a monument for immortality.
This is why Roman wills usually contained numerous further bequests in addition to the nomination of the heir. For example, the
testamentum Dasumii,23 has about 120 of them. When the addressees
gratefully remembered the deceased, the will fulfilled its higher purpose. This interrelationship between the giver and the receiver explains the genesis and truth of the 24ancient expression that the will is a
mirror of the testator's character.
Part of a deceased Roman's character presentation was openhandedness and charity, described by Cicero as beneficentia and liberalitas. Therefore, it was very common to free slaves in one's will.
Some forty years later, in 2 B.C., the lex Fufia Caninia limited this
custom by prescribing a limitation on the number of allowed manumissions. That lex was probably necessitated by the widespread
growth of Roman beneficentia.
This has merely been a short description of the peculiarities and
essence of the Roman will, which was threatened by the behavior of
heirs who profitably used their right to reject the inheritance. This
right gave Roman children incredible power over their fathers. According to everything we know about the ancient Roman family structure, it is obvious that such a situation must have been intolerable.
The praetor reacted by putting a new clause into his edict: si quis
omissa causa testamenti ab intestatopossideat hereditatem. The clause
carefully and warily balanced the interests involved. It left the heir
the freedom to abstain. But, if the heir intentionally used his right to
someone's detriment, the praetorianclause decreed the validity of the
will's bequests and manumissions. Thereby, the praetorsaved the social network map/immortality monument and left the family as much
23. Fontes Iurisprudentiae Romanae Anteiustiniani (ed. by Arangio-Ruiz), vol. 3 Nr. 48.
24. The letters of the younger Pliny 8.18.1.
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as the testator wanted to give to it. This reduced the children's power
under the lex Falcidia to a tolerable level.
The inclusion of these events is not free from speculation, because the date of the clause's origin is unknown. But, Labeo has commented on it.25 It is possible to conclude from D 35.2.1.2 that the lex
Falcidiawas the earlier legal remedy. Those possessing an inheritance
omissa causa were excluded from the regulations of the lex Falcidia
because the praetorianedict transferred the statute's force on them.
But, since the lex Falcidia itself regulated who was included and who
was not, it follows that the praetorianedict did not yet contain the si
quis omissa clause at that time, 40 B.C. Therefore, it is an acceptable
assumption that it originated in the late first century B.C.
III
The aforementioned development did not end with the end of the
republican times. At the beginning of the next century, Augustus
uniquely juridified and restructured the family relations through his
famous family legislation. 26 But, the reason why this legislation is not
covered here is not so much that it falls outside of the time of the
republic, but that it was based on a broad structuring plan. Its widespread coverage indicates a general crisis in the family as opposed to a
singular defect.
But, a conclusion can still be drawn from the aforementioned sequence of events. It is based on the assumption that these legal innovations were reactions to changes in social attitudes and intrafamilial
behavior. It can be concluded that the law comes into force when
morals, tradition, or common habit drift in a socially unacceptable direction. In other words, as soon as a social consensus vanishes, the
law steps in. The situation at the end of the republic was the same as
the situation before the introduction of the querela, lex Falcidia,and si
quis omissa. A testator's next of kin could generally expect to become
heirs and to receive a decent, if not satisfying, share of the estate, and
the testators were assured that their immortality monument would
come into force. Thus, a power equilibrium was reinstalled within the
25. Digests 29.4.1.12.

26. See only Norr, The Matrimonial Legislation of Augustus: An Early Instance of Social
Engineering, 16 Irish Jurist 350 seq. (1981); Treggiari, Roman Marriage: lusti Coniuges from the
time of Cicero to the time of Ulpian, 1991, p. 60 seq.; Mette-Dittmann, Die Ehegesetze des
Augustus: eine Untersuchung im Rahmen der Gesellschaftspolitik des Princeps, 1991.
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family. But, what originally was a matter of mores and testamental
27
custom, was now the result of legal pressure.

27. This is an abridged and revised version of an article that was published in 111 Zeitschrift
der Savigny-Stiftung far Rechtsgeschichte, romanistische Abteilung, p. 425 seq. (1994) under the
heading: Die Verrechtlichung der Familienbeziehungen in der Zeit der ausgehenden Republik
und ihr Einflu3 auf die Testierfreiheit.

